The depleting impact of experimentally manipulated expressive suppression (ES) on cognition (especially executive functioning and related processes) has been well-established (Baumeister, 2002a) . However, the impact of ES that occurs naturally in the course of daily life has not been examined. 62 adults (M= 22.89 years old) completed questions about recent ES burden (over the past two weeks and on the test day) and completed cognitive measures assessing executive functioning, working memory, and speed of information processing.
4 Naturally-occurring expressive suppression in daily life depletes executive functioning
The relationship between emotion regulation and other regulatory processes has received increasing attention from researchers seeking to understand the complex integration of affect and cognition in daily life. Expressive suppression (ES) is an emotion regulation strategy characterized by effortful control of facial affect and other automatic emotional responses, such as laughter or crying (Gross, 1998) . The need to transiently engage in ES is ubiquitous in daily life, and context-appropriate use of ES is associated with positive interpersonal functioning (Gross, 2007) . However, from a physiologic standpoint, ES often increases, rather than dampens, amygdalar and autonomic activation associated with the experience of an emotion (Ohira et al., 2006) , making it a highly effortful strategy that is best employed only for brief periods of time. Importantly, a growing body of research suggests that this effortful process of ES has deleterious effects on one's ability to control or regulate responses to a variety of challenges encountered in daily life.
This deleterious effect of ES has been extensively studied within the realm of social and experimental psychology, where it is generally referred to as the "depletion of self-control" (Baumeister, 2002) . For example, relative to controls, individuals who are directed to engage in ES are more likely to exhibit subsequent behavioral dyscontrol, including poorer physical stamina (i.e., handgrip strength) and higher rates of impulsive spending, breaking diets, aggressive responses, and willingness to engage in inappropriate sexual behaviors (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; Baumeister & Alquist, 2009) . Participants depleted by ES are also more likely to be persuaded by weak arguments (Baumeister & Alquist, 2009) , use simpler, more error-prone heuristics, and postpone SUPPRESSION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 5 decision-making relative to controls (Pocheptsova, Amir, Dhar, & Baumeister, 2009 ).
Because the construct of self-control is theoretically related to the neuro-cognitive domain of executive functioning (Baumeister, Schmeichel, Vohs, Kruglanski, & Higgins, 2007) , the above findings suggest that engagement in ES may specifically deplete executive cognitive functions. Executive functioning is an umbrella construct comprised of a set of higher-order cognitive processes that allow one to make choices and to engage in purposeful, goal-directed, future-oriented behavior (Suchy, 2009) . In other words, intact executive functioning is what allows one to stick to diets, abstain from substances, make reasoned decisions, and avoid socially inappropriate actions. Although no single globally accepted definition of executive functioning exists, it is generally agreed that executive functioning is multifaceted, and that the higher-order cognitive skills and abilities that fall under its umbrella include planning and reasoning, organization and problem solving, and the ability to follow-through with plans (Cummings & Miller, 2007; Suchy, 2009 ). These higher level abilities encompassed within the construct of executive functioning can be further broken down into more basic neurocognitive processes, such as initiation and inhibition, cognitive flexibility and generative fluency, and self-monitoring and discrepancy detection (Suchy, 2009) . Importantly, because executive functioning is a highly-effortful and attentionally-demanding process, it is prone to depletion (Baumeister et al., 2007) . Consequently, it becomes selectively engaged only in those situations when routine or automatic responses are either impossible or inappropriate (Suchy, 2009 ).
The assertion that executive functioning becomes depleted during engagement in ES can best be explained by conceptualizing ES itself as falling under the executive umbrella (Baumeister et al., 2007) . In fact, virtually by definition, successful ES requires that one be able to engage in behavioral initiation and inhibition, attentional control, and self-monitoring, that is, SUPPRESSION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 6 the same basic processes that make up executive abilities and skills (Suchy, 2009) . Additionally, similar to executive functioning, ES is highly effortful (Gailliot, 2010) , as it involves controlling emotional reactions while already physiologically aroused (Gross & Levenson, 1993) . In addition to the conceptual overlap between ES and executive functioning, neuroimaging evidence supports common neuroanatomic networks underlying both processes (i.e., dorsolateral, orbitofrontal, ventromedial, and anterior cingulate cortices) (Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2000; Beer & Lombardo, 2007; Goldin, McRae, Ramel, & Gross, 2008; Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Spinella, 2007; Suchy, 2011) .
The notion that ES depletes executive functioning is also supported by prior research.
For example, participants directed to engage in ES show poorer performance relative to controls on subsequently administered measures of logic and reasoning, cognitive extrapolation, response inhibition, and working memory (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003; Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007; Schmeichel, 2007) , all representing processes that fall under the executive umbrella.
Furthermore, targets of stereotype threat who spontaneously regulate the appearance of anxiety in response to threat priming also perform more poorly on subsequent cognitive tests than do their non-suppressing peers (Johns, Inzlicht, & Schmader, 2008) . This latter finding suggests that naturally-occurring ES (as opposed to ES that is experimentally induced) may also be associated with depletion of cognitive resources and underperformance in the near-term.
Importantly, it also appears that depleted states are not instantly resolved with the removal of a taxing ES demand, but may instead persist for an indeterminate period of time (Baumeister, 2002b; Gailliot, 2010; Pocheptsova et al., 2009; Schmeichel et al., 2003; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006 However, certain characteristics of past research limit our ability to draw more definitive conclusion. First, although the depletion effect has high internal validity, the external validity of this effect is uncertain. This is because existing findings are based exclusively on ES that is induced experimentally in a laboratory, where the impact of depletion can be maximized.
Specifically, most prior studies have experimentally manipulated ES by strictly prohibiting participants from expressing their emotions while, for example, viewing disturbing images, being exposed to experimenter provocation, or being exposed to tempting stimuli; these studies have then assessed the depletion virtually immediately upon completing the ES manipulation, with no intervening events in between Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007; Johns et al., 2008; Richeson et al., 2005; Schmeichel, 2007; Schmeichel et al., 2003; Shamosh & Gray, 2007; Stucke & Baumeister, 2006) . However, in the course of daily life, the requirements for engagement in ES may be less strict than those in the laboratory, and are not always immediately followed by cognitive or self-control challenges. Thus, it is possible that the depleting effect may be too fleeting or too negligible to have a meaningful impact on daily cognitive functioning.
Second, the existing depletion research is incomplete and non-specific regarding the cognitive mechanisms underlying the apparent effect of ES on executive functioning. This issue is important because cognition is organized in a hierarchical fashion (Stuss, Picton, & Alexander, 2001) , such that higher-order processes (such as executive functioning) depend on lower order processes (such as the simple ability to perceive a stimulus, as well as the speed at which the stimulus is perceived). Thus, for example, effective planning and problem solving (i.e., executive functioning) can only occur at the speed at which one processes new information as it is introduced in the environment (i.e., processing speed), and only if such information can be SUPPRESSION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 8 registered, retained, and manipulated over short periods of time (i.e., working memory). This conceptualization of the relationship between executive functioning and component cognitive processes is supported by clinical presentations. For example, individuals with Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD) typically exhibit deficits on timed measures of executive functioning and on measures of working memory and processing speed, demonstrating that executive disorders in this population are likely based on deficits in the component cognitive processes of working memory and processing speed (Katz, Brown, Roth, & Beers, 2011) . In other words, disruptions in lower-order component processes (including working memory and processing speed) can mimic disruption in the higher order processes (i.e., executive functioning). In contrast, adults reporting depressive symptoms in the mildly to moderately severe range exhibit higher order executive problems (e.g., abstract reasoning and problem solving) in the absence of specific deficits in working memory or processing speed (Grant, Thase, & Sweeney, 2011) . These examples illustrate that it is both possible and important to dissociate higher-order and lower-order processes.
Unfortunately, past research on the depletion effect of ES has not systematically examined the discrete cognitive processes that could be implicated. In fact, much existing research linking ES with compromised executive functioning shows that ES deleteriously affects performance on tasks related to, but not necessarily synonymous with, executive functioning.
For example, some studies measure the effect of ES on behaviors in which executive abilities are implicated (i.e., suppressing aggressive responses to insults, resisting tempting foods, and persistence on difficult puzzles) without providing evidence of an underlying cognitive depletion (Baumeister, 2002a; Baumeister & Alquist, 2009; Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006; Gailliot, 2010) . Others have measured the effect of ES on working memory (e.g., the Operation SUPPRESSION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 9 Span task, reverse digit span) without assessing higher order executive functions (Schmeichel, 2007) , and others yet have assessed higher-order deductive and inductive reasoning tasks (e.g., logic problems from standardized testing such as the GRE and the CET, Raven's Progressive Matrices, etc.) without examining lower-order processes (Schmeichel et al., 2003; Shamosh & Gray, 2007) . The few published studies measuring the effect of ES on a commonly-accepted standardized test of executive functioning, such as the Stroop test (Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007; Johns et al., 2008; Richeson, Trawalter, & Shelton, 2005) , have relied on a single measure, once again failing to examine the lower-order component processes of working memory and processing speed.
In sum, ES is an effortful emotion regulation strategy used commonly by people in their daily lives. Research shows that acute ES engagement leads to depletion of cognitive resources, resulting in poorer performance on subsequently administered measures of executive functioning and other related neurocognitive and behavioral processes. However, while high internal validity of the depletion effect has been demonstrated in laboratory settings, it is not clear whether (a) the impact of natually-occurring ES on cognitive performance is of sufficient magnitude to significantly affect cognitive processes and (b) whether that effect is in fact specific to executive functioning.
Purpose of the Current Study
The purposes of the present study were two-fold. First (1), we aimed to determine whether self-reported, naturally occurring burden of ES (rather than experimentally manipulated ES) is associated with compromised cognitive performance that is practically meaningful, and second (2), we aimed to determine whether this effect is specific to executive functioning, or whether it applies to related cognitive abilities confounded with executive functioning in prior SUPPRESSION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 10 studies (i.e., working memory and processing speed). To those ends, we asked a sample of young adults to report on the degree to which they had recently engaged in ES and administered a battery of cognitive tests (including measures of executive functioning, working memory, and processing speed). We hypothesized that self-reported burden of ES would account for greater variance in measures of executive functioning and working memory (consistent with prior work) than in measures of processing speed.
Method Participants
Participants were 78 undergraduate volunteers enrolled in psychology courses at the University of Utah who participated in exchange for research participation credit. Participants were screened for moderate to severe level of depression (per a total raw score greater than 14 on the Beck Depression Inventory 2) (N= 12), due to the potential impact of depression on cognition (McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009 ). Additionally, participants were screened for self-reported history of severe mental illness (e.g., psychotic disorders.) (N=0), any serious neurologic condition that affects the central nervous system (e.g., seizure disorder, moderate to severe traumatic brain injury, hydrocephalus, etc.) (N=5), or any serious medical condition known to affect the central nervous system (e.g., heart disease, diabetes, etc.) (N= 3). The final sample used in principle analyses consisted of 62 undergraduate volunteers who were mostly female (64.5%) and right-handed (88.7%). Their mean age was 22.89 years (SD = 4.97, Range= 18-37 years), and they were in their junior year of college on average (M= 13.76 years of education completed, SD = 1.38, Range=11-17). The sample was relatively diverse, with 64.5% of the sample being White/Caucasian, 9.7% Asian, 11.3% Hispanic, 8.1% of multi-ethnic background, and 6.5% declining to provide their ethnic identity.
Procedures and Instruments
The study was approved by the appropriate university Institutional Review Board and all procedures were in compliance with APA ethical standards. After undergoing informed consent procedures, participants completed a 3-hour long neuropsychological testing battery one-on-one with an examiner in the Neuropsychology Laboratory in the Social and Behavioral Sciences building on the University of Utah campus. The battery included measures designed to assess processing speed, working memory, executive functioning, depressive symptoms, and burden of ES both a) over the past two weeks and b) on the test day (administered in this order). We used age-corrected scaled scores for all analyses, allowing us to determine the level (e.g., average, below average, etc.) of performance on our measures relative to national norms.
Processing speed. We administered WAIS-III subtests that are used to compute the Processing Speed Index (PSI), which is a widely accepted index of motor, perceptual, and mental speed (Wechsler, 1997a) . Coding and Symbol Search subtests were included in the composite.
The composite was generated by computing an arithmetical mean from the two tests' scaled scores derived from the test manual. In this sample, Cronbach's alpha for this composite was .684.
Working memory. We administered subtests from the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale III (WAIS-III) that are used to compute the Working Memory Index (WMI),which is a widely accepted, highly reliable index of the ability to hold in mind and manipulate information for a short period of time (Wechsler, 1997a) . The following subtests were included in the composite: Digit Span, Arithmetic, and Letter Number Sequencing. The composite was generated by computing an arithmetical mean from the three tests' scaled scores derived from the test manual.
In this sample, Cronbach's alpha for this composite was .829.
Executive functioning. When assessing executive functioning, it is important to consider that due to the hierarchical structure of cognition (Stuss, Picton, & Alexander, 2001 ) any single measure of executive functioning necessarily relies on a number of component processes (e.g., in addition to executive functioning, the Stroop test has working memory and processing speed components). Thus, when using a single measure, it is not clear whether an observed performance decrement is due to an effect on executive functions or an effect on one or more of the component cognitive processes. To mitigate this issue, we created a composite of several tests from the Delis-Kaplan Executive Function System battery (D-KEFS) (Delis, Kramer, Kaplan, & Holdnack, 2004) , which is a well-validated, widely used battery of executive functioning. Creating a composite of several measures allows the variance accounted for by some of the component processes to cancel out (as different tasks require somewhat different component processes), while the variance that is shared by all four tasks (i.e., executive functioning) remains. In keeping with similar prior research (Kraybill, Thorgusen, & Suchy, 2013 Kraybill & Suchy, 2011 Williams, Suchy, & Kraybill, 2010) , we created a composite of the following tasks: Trail Making Test (Letter Number Sequencing Condition completion time), Design Fluency (total designs completed), Letter Fluency (total words generated), and ColorWord Interference (Inhibition Condition completion time), all of which are among commonly used measures of executive functioning. These four tasks rely to differing degrees on initiation and inhibition, cognitive flexibility and generative fluency, working memory and memory retrieval, as well as attention, self-monitoring, and discrepancy detection.
We created the composite by computing an arithmetical mean of scaled scores generated from the DKEFS norms. Use of scaled scores allows for a comparison of each individual participant's performance to age matched controls in a large national normative sample on a SUPPRESSION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 13 standardized metric (with a mean of 10 and SD of 3). In a clinical context, a scaled score difference of at least 2/3 of a SD is considered clinically interpretable, as this level of difference is sufficient to move an individual's performance into a different descriptive category (e.g. from average to low average, or from low average to borderline impaired). In this sample, Cronbach's alpha for this composite was .644.
Depression. The Beck Depression Inventory, 2
nd edition (BDI-2), a highly reliable screening measure for depression (Beck, Ward, Mendelson, Mock, & Erbaugh, 1961) , was administered to further characterize the sample and to ensure that no participants were in moderate to severe ranges of depression (total raw score greater than 14).
Burden of expressive suppression. For the purpose of this study, we developed a set of 15 items that inquired about participants' burden of expressive suppression across two different time-frames: (a) over the course of the past two weeks excluding today and (b) today (i.e., on the day of testing). Our choice to inquire about ES across two different time-frames was theoretically based. Specifically, we inquired about ES on the day of testing because past research shows that transient ES shortly before testing acutely depletes executive functioning (Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, 2006) . In contrast, although chronic or prolonged use of ES has been shown to have deleterious consequences on emotional and physical health (Aldao, Nolen-Hoeksema, & Schweizer, 2010; Denollet, Martens, Nyklíček, Conraads, & de Gelder, 2008; Moore, Zoellner, & Mollenholt, 2008; Myers et al., 2008) , its impact on executive functioning has not been previously examined. However, because it can be assumed that individuals who experience depressive symptoms may also need to engage more frequently in ES, and because major depression is associated with executive weaknesses (Castaneda, TuulioHenriksson, Marttunen, Suvisaari, & Loennqvist, 2008) , it is possible that more chronic or Gross & John, 2003) and further developed to reflect specific examples of engagement in suppression of both positive and negative affect, consistent with the process model of emotion regulation (Gross, 1998) . However, in contrast to existing measures, our self-report items specifically inquired about the burden of ES (i.e., having to work hard, expending effort, etc.), and specifically inquired about ES state (i.e., on the day of testing), rather than only trait characteristics. Items for both time-frames (today and two weeks) were answered on a five point scale: "never" (0), "once or twice" (1), "sometimes" (2), "often" (3), or "all the time" (4). Scores for today and two weeks used in principle analyses were composed of items found to contribute to internal consistency in this sample (see Table 1 ). See Results for reliability and preliminary construct validity.
Additionally, as a validity check, participants responded to two items: "The past two weeks have been very typical for me -I have felt and behaved like my usual self," and "Over the course of today's session, I have felt and behaved like my usual self." These items were scored on a five point scale from "not at all" to "very like my usual self." These items were intended to gauge the degree to which ES burden and its consequences on feelings/behavior were experienced as notably atypical by participants, thereby addressing the question of whether the assessed ES burden more likely reflected a stable style or a transient state.
Results

Preliminary Analyses
Burden of Expressive suppression: Psychometrics and Validation. First, we computed Cronbach's alpha, examining individual items for two weeks and today separately (15 items each), and eliminated detracting items in a stepwise fashion until a set of only contributing items was identified. A set of 11 items (see Table 1 ) met this criterion for both ES on the day of testing and over the course of the preceding two weeks (Cronbach's alphas = .766 and .798, respectively). We then computed the sum of the items for ES burden on the day of testing (i.e., "ES-Today" score) and a separate sum for ES burden over the past two weeks (i.e., "ES2Weeks" score). Descriptives for these two composite scores in the present sample were as follows: ES-Today M=6.50, SD=6.11, Range= 0 to 26; ES-2Weeks M=11.97, SD=7.08, Range= 0 to 29. The discrepancy between mean scores for ES-Today vs. ES-2Weeks likely reflects narrower window of opportunity to experience burdensome ES when reporting on only 1 day (i.e., the day of testing) vs. when reporting on a period of two weeks. As a reminder, the range of possible scores for ES-Today and for ES-2Weeks was 0 -44 (with responses to each of 11 items ranging from 0 -4).
[ INSERT TABLE 1 HERE] Next, we examined correlations between ES-Today and ES-2Weeks, as well as between the two ES scores and (a) the BDI-2 scores and (b) self-report of the degree to which the participants felt their feelings and behaviors were typical for them (i.e., "typicality"). These correlations are reported in (Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003; Inzlicht & Gutsell, 2007; Schmeichel, 2007) . Lastly, participants with high BDI-2 scores also viewed their feelings and behaviors over the course of the past two weeks as less typical, consistent with the notion that depression is an ego-dystonic disorder, and providing validity for the participants' self-report of the typicality of their feelings and behaviors.
[
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE]
Zero order correlations with cognition. Zero order correlations among ES-Today, ES2Weeks, and the cognitive variables (executive functioning, working memory, and processing speed composites) are presented in Table 3 . As can be seen, executive functioning, working memory, and processing speed composites were all related to each other, as would be expected.
Additionally, none of the cognitive variables were related to either ES-Today or ES-2Weeks, suggesting that if relationships exist, they likely involve more complex interactions among these variables. The possibility of such interactions was examined in Principal Analyses.
[INSERT (Table 2 ) and thus could confound any association between ES burden and executive functioning, we entered the BDI-2 scores (depression) as a predictor on
Step 1. Scores for ES-2Weeks and ES-Today were entered on Steps 2 and 3, respectively, to allow for an examination of the contribution of transient ES burden on the day of testing above and beyond participants' more chronic daily ES burden. Lastly, the interaction term (i.e., the interaction between ES-Today and ES-2Weeks) was entered on Step 4. Results are presented in Table 4 (Model 1). As can be seen in the table, the interaction term significantly predicted executive performance, contributing 16.5% of variance above and beyond previous steps.
Neither ES-Today nor ES-2Weeks singly contributed to executive functioning, consistent with zero-order correlations (Table 3) . Reversal of the order of variable entry (i.e., reversing Steps 2 and 3) did not substantively change the individual contributions of ES-Today and ES-2Weeks.
Together, these findings show that one's chronic daily ES burden interacts with transient ES burden fluctuations that occur on the day of testing, and that this interaction is significantly associated with executive functioning performance.
[INSERT Figure 1 illustrates the magnitude of this interaction. As can be seen in the Figure, high ES burden on the day of testing (ES-Today= 12.61 on average compared to a sample mean of 6.50) is associated with decreased executive performance by as much as 2/3 of a standard deviation (i.e., 2 scaled scores) for those individuals who reported their ES burden over the course of the past two weeks to be average or low (ES-2Weeks ranging from 4.89 to the sample mean of 11.97). As a reminder, 2/3 of a SD is considered to be clinically-notable deviation from previous performance (see Method). In fact, as a group, participants who reported the lowest burden of ES on the day of testing exhibited above average performances (scaled scores >12) on measures of executive functioning. In contrast, those with the highest levels of ES on the day of testing exhibited group performance that was squarely average (scaled scores 8-11). This SUPPRESSION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 19 suggests a meaningful association between naturally-occurring ES burden and executive functioning relative to age-matched peers in a normative sample.
INSERT FIGURE 1 HERE]
ES burden and lower-order component cognitive processes. In order to determine whether the depleting effect of ES is specific to executive functioning or whether it also applies to working memory and processing speed, we repeated the hierarchical regressions above with working memory and processing speed composite scores as the criterion variables. Results for working memory and processing speed are summarized in Tables 6 and 7, respectively. As can be seen in Table 6 (Model 1), the ES interaction term contributed significant variance to the prediction of working memory performance. However, when executive functioning was added to the model, ES variables no longer contributed unique variance (Table 6 , Model 2), suggesting that it was the executive demands of the tasks that were responsible for the relationship between ES and working memory. With respect to processing speed, as seen in Table 7 [INSERT Finally, we considered the significant correlations among cognitive composite scores (Table 3) . Specifically, we examined whether the ES burden interaction term would continue to predict executive functioning performance after accounting for component cognitive processes (i.e. working memory and processing speed). To that end, we repeated the hierarchical regressions, adding working memory and processing speed composites to the model on Step 2 (i.e., after depression on Step 1). Results are presented in Table 4 (Model 2). As can be seen in the table, although working memory and processing speed composites added significant variance to the prediction of executive functioning (33.2% collectively) above and beyond depression, the ES burden interaction term continued to contribute significantly above and beyond all previous steps (accounting for an additional 5.7% of variance).
Discussion
The current study was designed to investigate the external validity of the depletion effect identified in the social literature by testing (1) whether naturally-occurring ES burden is significantly associated with cognitive test performance, and, if so, (2) whether this effect is specific to executive functioning, as opposed to working memory or processing speed, which are component cognitive processes unavoidably included in measures of executive functioning. To those ends, we examined the relationship between self-reported burden of ES and performances on standardized tests of executive functioning, working memory, and processing speed.
The first key finding of this study is that the depletion effect applies to naturallyoccurring ES, such that incidentally-high burden of ES on the day of the study (approximately 6 raw score points on average above the sample mean) was associated with significantly-poorer SUPPRESSION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 21 executive functioning performance relative to peers. Specifically, individuals with normally (i.e., over the past two weeks) average to low burden of ES (raw score points ranging from the sample mean to approximately 7 raw score points below the mean) exhibited considerable executive decrements when their ES burden was high on the day of testing. In contrast, individuals who reported high ES over the course of the past 2 weeks (approximately 7 raw score points on average above the sample mean) exhibited executive performances that were apparently unaffected by the burden of ES on the day of testing. This relationship held even after accounting for depression levels as well as working memory and processing speed performances.
The second key finding is that the depleting effect of ES burden within the past 24 hours is specific to executive functioning. In contrast, high ES burden over the course of the past two weeks is associated with poorer performances on measures of processing speed, regardless of ES burden in the past 24 hours. Once again, this relationship held even after accounting for depression levels and executive performance. To our knowledge, this is the first study to measure self-reported burden of ES and to differentiate the executive effects of depletion from confounding cognitive processes of working memory and processing speed.
These results support the external validity of the depletion effect and suggest that experimental manipulations of ES and self-reported ES burden tap into a related (if not the same)
construct. Thus, our findings support self report as a viable alternative to experimental manipulation of ES, broadening the potential populations in which the depletion effect can be measured. For instance, in clinical settings, affective dysregulation tends to be associated with deficits in executive functioning in a variety of patient populations, including depression (Gross & Muñoz, 1995) and schizophrenia (Henry et al., 2007 Questionnaire (Gross & John, 2003) , the Cognitive Emotion Regulation Questionnaire (Garnefski, Kraaij, & Spinhoven, 2001) , the Inventory of Cognitive Affect Regulation Strategies (Kamholz, Hayes, Carver, Gulliver, & Perlman, 2006) , and the Difficulties in Emotion
Regulation Scale (Gratz & Roemer, 2004) ), we are unaware of any currently-published scales measuring the clinically-relevant daily fluctuations in ES burden. Based on our results, selfreported ES is a promising new approach to measuring the depletion effect, and future validation and psychometric development of self-reported ES items is warranted.
Using age-corrected scaled scores, we were also able to characterize the magnitude of the depletion effect relative to normative samples. Importantly, among participants who reported their ES burden to be average to low on a daily basis but high on the day of testing, executive performances were on average 2/3 of a scale score standard deviation below their peers reporting consistently-low ES burden. A performance change of this magnitude is enough to classify participants into different performance categories; specifically, while participants with low ES burden on the day of testing performed in the high average range (as would be expected of a college-student population), participants with high ES burden on the day of testing showed performance that was in the average range. Performance fluctuation of this magnitude associated with the burden of recent, naturally-occurring ES supports the practical relevance of the depletion effect for cognitive and behavioral control outside the laboratory.
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These results contribute to evolving conceptualizations of ES as a distinctly executive activity, or, conversely, that executive functioning is comprised not only of cognitive processes, but also at least some aspects of emotion regulation (consistent with previously reported functional and neuroanatomic overlap between ES and executive functioning; Bechara et al., 2000; Beer & Lombardo, 2007; Goldin et al., 2008; Ochsner & Gross, 2007; Spinella, 2007) . In providing support for an overlap between specific self-regulatory processes, these results are also consistent with a shift in cognitive and neuroscience research away from artificially separate faculties in favor of a constructionist view that integrates cognitive and affective activites (Lindquist & Feldman Barrett, 2012; Suchy, 2011, pp. 8, 252) . The current study takes these associations a step further by accounting for the contributions of component cognitive processes to executive functioning, and demonstrating a relative lack of association between acute elevations in ES and these component processes. This suggests that the depletion effect is indeed related to the recruitment of higher order executive functions, as opposed to the monopolization of basic attentional resources (Gross, 2007) . However, while our results are consistent with a resource depletion view of self-regulation, they do not provide direct evidence of the mechanism by which suppression on the day of testing might affect executive performance. Recent research suggests that other processes tangentially related to executive functioning, including changes in motivation and attention following an initial self-regulatory task, contribute to subsequent regulatory depletion (Inzlicht & Schmeichel, 2012) .
In contrast to the effect of acutely elevated ES burden (i.e., only on the day of testing), chronic ES elevations appear to have a deleterious impact on processing speed. Considering that a full account of contributing factors to ratings of ES over two weeks (including individual differences in trait negative affectivity and other personality factors) is unavailable, the causal SUPPRESSION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 24 underpinnings of this finding are difficult to interpret based on these data. However, the differential positive relationship between depressive symptoms and burden of ES over two weeks in this sample (as opposed to a non-significant relationship between depression and burden of ES today) suggests that ES-2Weeks is more closely related to baseline individual differences than is ES-Today. Regardless of the exact interpretation of the ES-2Weeks construct, the present results need to be viewed as largely correlational in nature, precluding clear causal interpretations. On the one hand, it is possible that individuals who are experiencing chronic stress and/or depression experience psychomotor retardation which causes the slow speed. On the other hand, it is possible that individuals with poorer processing speed experience greater distress in the fastpaced college environment, leading to increased burden of ES. The relationship of ES-2Weeks
and Today to other individual difference variables (e.g., personality, coping styles, etc.) that are relevant for affective expression, as well as the possibility that chronic ES elevations may represent the mechanism behind slower speed of processing among mildly to moderately depressed individuals, should be examined in future research.
Findings of the present study suggest individual differences in susceptibility to the depleting relationship between ES burden and executive functioning performance. Specifically, we found an association between higher-than-usual burden of ES suppression and apparent executive underperformance on the day of testing. Conversely, participants reporting the highest burden of ES over the previous two weeks in this sample exhibited a non-significant relationship between their burden of ES and their executive performance on the day of testing. To the extent that self-reported ES burden over the previous two weeks is reflective of chronic/trait burden of ES, it is possible that suppression becomes habitual when utilized over the long term (in which case the effort associated with engagement in ES on any particular day may be diminished SUPPRESSION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 25 compared with those who do not habitually rely on ES as a regulatory strategy). If ES is no longer effortful for these individuals, then it might be less reliant on executive resources, and therefore less related to executive performance. Consistent with the idea that chronicallyelevated ES burden is associated with less executive effort than is acutely-elevated ES burden, it may be the case that individuals relying more consistently on ES as a regulatory strategy actually have different beliefs about their resources for self-regulation that influence their performance on a range of effortful tasks (consistent with recent work demonstrating that participants who viewed self-regulation as a limited resource may be more susceptible to depletion; Job, Dweck, & Walton, 2010) . Conversely, it may be the case that individuals for whom the depletion effect was apparently non-significant were in fact over-reporting their recent ES burden (or that the rest of the sample under-reported their recent ES burden). However, an empirical explanation for this finding is unavailable based on these data and future research should examine these and other hypotheses regarding individual differences in the depletion effect.
Limitations and Future Directions
The present study has several potential limitations. First, we examined the association between ES and executive functioning in a predominantly female, white, college-educated adult sample. It is possible that differences in the observed effect might exist based on ethnic, cultural, and even religious differences (due to differences in the meaning, effortfulness, acceptability, or frequency of ES) that were not examined in this study. Age differences might also exist, such that the effort associated with ES is different for children and older adults. Therefore, the generalizability of these results in the general population may be limited. Future studies should SUPPRESSION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 26 examine this effect in larger, more ethnically and culturally diverse samples and in different age groups.
Second, because measures were administered in a standard order (processing speed, working memory, executive functioning, depressive symptoms, and burden of ES), we are unable to rule out the possibility of order effects. Considering that this was a relatively brief battery administered to a non-clinical sample, it is unlikely that administration order significantly affected performance on the cognitive tests (e.g. via fatigue or learning effects; Khorramdel & Frebort, 2011) . Similarly, it is unlikely that ratings of depressive symptoms and burden of ES over the past two weeks (explicitly "excluding today") were significantly influenced by their order in the battery. However, because all participants rated their burden of ES "today" at the end of the battery, these ratings included the study period. This introduces the possibility that their ratings of the past 24 hours were influenced to an unknown extent by their regulatory efforts during the study (e.g. perhaps participants varied in their burden of ES due to different emotional responses elicited by the testing itself). Future studies examining recent burden of ES via selfreport should report their order of administration and may wish to counterbalance the order of self-report administration to control for potential order effects.
Third, because we do not have measures of baseline cognitive performance for our sample, we are unable to address the extent to which high ES burden on a given day is causally related to cognitive performance on that day. However, considering that we measure ES burden via selfreport rather than via experimental manipulation in the present study, it seems less likely that baseline cognitive performance conducted on the day of the study would differ significantly from post-self-report cognitive performance on average. Furthermore, the present results suggest that higher-than-usual burden of ES on any given test day could be associated with poorer executive SUPPRESSION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 27 performance and that high burden of ES in any given two week period could be associated with poorer processing speed performance. This renders selection of an appropriate time point at which to measure baseline cognitive performance (i.e. in a period of time during which participants exert average or below-average effort in the service of ES) unwieldy for our purposes. However, in addition to the existing literature base demonstrating the effect of experimentally-manipulated ES on cognitive performance, future research might begin to address the question of causation by following a large sample with baseline cognitive performance and self-reported burden of ES over time, such that fluctuations in performance and regulatory activity could be examined in conjunction.
Fourth, all executive functioning tests in our battery are timed, demanding speeded performance. However, unlike previous studies, we included separate measures of processing speed to account for this component cognitive skill. Future studies may wish to include untimed executive functioning measures in order to more directly compare executive functioning without processing speed to executive functioning with processing speed. It is at least possible that ES affects performance where the total cognitive load is greatest (executive functioning plus processing speed plus working memory demands), and not necessarily performance on less demanding (i.e. untimed) planning and organization tasks. Speed demands and time limits also contribute to the modest reliability of the D-KEFS subtests used in our study. Therefore, these results should be replicated and examined longitudinally to determine the consistency of the relationship between ES-Today and executive performance across different studies, measures of executive functioning, and retest intervals.
Fifth, the burden of ES was measured using self-report. While we view this methodology as a strength and a novel contribution that allowed us to address questions that could not have been SUPPRESSION AND EXECUTIVE FUNCTIONING 28 addressed with the experimental methods typically employed in this line of research, it is nevertheless undeniable that self-report may be inaccurate due to failures in memory, perceived demand characteristics, participants' current states of mind or the degree to which past events are salient to them. Therefore, further validation of the measure used in the present study will be an important topic for future research. Relatedly, it will also be important to carefully examine the degree to which various clinical diagnoses impact patients' ability to accurately self-report on ES burden, as patients may have limitations in memory, insight, or willingness to disclose.
Nevertheless, with respect to the present study, we feel that the theoretically cogent findings provide an initial, albeit tentative, validation of the construct and provide preliminary evidence of our ability to assess ES burden via self-report, at least among young, healthy participants.
Sixth, because the theoretically important topic of the study was not whether participants successfully engaged in ES but rather how burdensome their ES engagement was for them, many of our items asked participants about whether or not they put forth much effort while engaging in ES. Although we believe that this approach is theoretically and conceptually appropriate, it inadvertently introduces the possibility that perhaps individuals with poor EF find ES more burdensome (i.e., they need to put forth more effort in order to be successful). However, this potential alternative interpretation of our results is somewhat unlikely, mainly because individuals with chronically low levels of EF should report chronically high ES effort (which was not the case), and should also find the degree of their effort to be "typical" (which was not the case). Nevertheless, future research should explore the possibility that engagement in any activity that is perceived as effortful (i.e., not just ES) may be associated with poorer EF on the day of testing.
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Seventh, the total raw scores for the ES-Today and ES-2Weeks are not directly mutually comparable. This is because participants have a greater window of opportunity to experience burdensome ES over the course of two weeks than over the course of a single day. This lack of direct comparability across the two time periods introduces an interesting apparent paradox with respect to the participants' self-reports of the typicality of their ES burden on the day of testing vs. over the past two weeks. Specifically, ES burden on the day of testing was negatively correlated with self-report of typicality during testing, such that individuals who experienced higher levels of ES-Today viewed their feelings and behaviors during the testing session as less typical. However, given that the overall ES-2Week was higher than the overall ES-Today, it may at first glance appear that people experienced less ES burden on the day of testing than was typical for the two-week period, not more as the correlation with typicality suggests. In interpreting these findings, it is also important to note that a given participant's lower overall scores for ES-Today as compared to ES-2Weeks do not necessarily mean that the participant experiences lesser burden on the day of testing relative to his or her typical levels. Specifically, if a participant's response to a given ES-2Weeks item is "sometimes" (i.e., a 2-point response), this implies that on a handful of the past 14 days the participant may have once or twice been burdened by that particular type of ES. If the same participant responds to the corresponding ES-Today item "once or twice" (i.e., a 1-point response), this response may still reflect a somewhat atypical ES burden on the day of testing, as on most days this participant may never engage in this particular aspect of ES. Consequently, a lower overall score on the day of testing relative to the past two weeks may still reflect higher than typical ES burden on the day of testing. Future validation and psychometric work with this instrument should consider the Guided by the results of the simple slopes analyses, we divided the sample into three groups:
those who reported their ES burden over the course of the past two weeks (ES-2Weeks) to be 1) low (n=18, 34% of the sample) (Range= 0-7), 2) average (n=24, 45% of the sample) (Range= 8-16), and 3) high (n=11, 21% of the sample) (Range= 17-29). As can be seen, among participants with low to average ES-2Weeks, there is a significant impact of ES-Today on executive functioning. Specifically, increased burden of ES-Today is associated with poorer performance on measures of executive functioning. As evident from the regression line, this decrement was on average more than 2 scaled scores (i.e., 2/3 of s.d.) for participants who reported the highest burden of ES-Today.
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Figure 2. The figure illustrates performances on measures of processing speed based on the magnitude of ES-2Weeks (i.e., the burden of expressive suppression over the course of the past 2 weeks) on (N=62). As can be seen, increased burden of ES-2Weeks is associated with poorer performance on measures of processing speed. As evident from the regression line, this decrement was on average more than 2 scaled scores (i.e., 2/3 of s.d.) for participants who reported the highest burden of ES-2Weeks.
